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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION, LEGAL THEORY, AND
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

DOUGLAS R. WILLIAMS*
Congressional power . . . is never lost, rarely taken by force, and almost always
given away.1

Congress, as an institution, has, over the years, given away a lot of power
to the Presidency.2 Dr. Louis Fisher’s account of Congressional abdication
focuses on two fundamental areas of constitutional governance: the power to
take the nation to war and the power of the purse.3 In this essay, I consider
first whether Congressional abdication might be viewed as a more general
phenomenon, extending into other areas to which the Constitution assigns
responsibility to Congress. I then offer some thoughts on why Congress might
abdicate its constitutional powers.
The question of whether and why Congress abdicates power is a complex
one.4 In Part I, I consider the distinction Dr. Fisher draws between abdication
and delegation. I conclude that, with respect to war and budgetary matters,
congressional behavior is different from ordinary forms of delegation.
Nonetheless, delegation poses some of the same general concerns that attend
Dr. Fisher’s claim of abdication. For that reason, it makes sense to consider
these behaviors as linked, with an initial hypothesis that they stem from the
same general conditions.
* Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.
1. David B. Frohnmayer, The Separation of Powers: An Essay on the Vitality Of a
Constitutional Idea, 52 OR. L. REV. 211, 220 (1973).
2. And arguably to the courts, as well. See Steven Puro, Congress-Supreme Court
Relations: Strategies of Power, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 117 (2000). But that’s another
story to be told elsewhere. See also Douglas R. Williams, Demonstrating and Explaining
Congressional Abdication: Why Does Congress Abdicate Power?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1013
(1999).
3. Louis Fisher, War and Spending Prerogatives: Stages of Congressional Abdication, 19
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7 (2000) (hereinafter Stages).
4. Studies of congressional behavior are voluminous. For a sampling, see DAVID R.
MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974); MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS:
KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977); CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY
(Mathew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987); CONGRESS RECONSIDERED (Lawrence C.
Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 5th ed. 1993); KAY L. SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY,
ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986).
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In Part II, I explore the question of why Congress might willingly choose
to give away power. In my view, partial explanations or factors of significance
are about the best one can hope to identify in pursuing this inquiry. I will first
argue that, to the extent that Congress may be said to have abdicated its
constitutional authority, a public choice analytic supplies a useful starting
point. On this view, individual Members of Congress will act in ways that
maximize their opportunities for reelection. In some circumstances, choices
that maximize reelection opportunities may compromise institutional powers
and responsibility. In cases of this sort, we should expect the interests of
individual members in advancing their own fortunes to dominate over the
members’ interest in advancing institutional interests.
In Part III, I introduce another important factor contributing to
congressional abdication. Recognizing that legal theory and decisional law
effectively set the ground rules within which public programs may operate, I
argue that current theory and doctrine have facilitated a shift in authority from
Congress to the Presidency — a shift in power in which Congress has largely
acquiesced. This shift is broadly consistent with the observations in Part II, for
legal theory and norms support those institutional arrangements that favor and
promote activities by members that are likely to maximize their prospects of
reelection.
In Part IV, adopting a perspective that respects and values constitutional
provision for deliberative democracy, I speculate about the effects of
delegation and abdication. Dr. Fisher concludes that shifts in power from
Congress to the Presidency “undermine democracy and the rule of law.”5
Similarly, critics of delegation insist that the practice “weakens democracy”
and “endangers liberty.”6 My conclusions are more mixed. In many cases, it
may be entirely unclear from which institution — Congress or the Presidency
— one could expect greater responsiveness to the public and opportunities for
deliberation about public goods. Tentatively, it appears that the Presidency
may be more capable of fostering public dialogue about certain programs, but
may have incentives toward autocracy in other areas of decision making.
Somewhat unexpectedly, these observations lead back to Lou Fisher’s
argument. His insistence upon making a categorical distinction between
abdication and delegation when considering the powers of war and budgets can
be supported by examining the broad circumstances in which executive action
may be prone to autocracy. I conclude that in these areas, strong congressional
involvement is likely to be necessary to ensure an effective, deliberative, and
responsive process, while in other areas, broad delegations of authority may
facilitate public deliberation and democratic processes.
5. Fisher, Stages, supra note 3, at 63.
6. DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 99-118 (1993).
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ABDICATION, DELEGATION, AND CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

In considering congressional abdication, the primary focus of Dr. Fisher’s
work has been on war and budget powers. In these areas, Dr. Fisher makes a
compelling case that Congress’s behavior amounts to such a distortion of the
constitutional structure that one could reasonably conclude that Congress has
abdicated power, or at least, responsibility. I, like Professor Devins, harbor
some reservations about whether “abdication” is the appropriate term,7 but I
also adhere to a conclusion I reached in an earlier essay: There is something
different about the manner in which Congress approaches questions of war and
budgets than the manner in which Congress exercises (or abdicates) its other
constitutional authority.8 As Dr. Fisher details, in matters of war and budgets
Congress has not only acceded to Presidential prerogatives, but has also
concurred with Presidential interpretations of the Constitution that diminish
congressional authority while advancing broad executive powers.9
While it is useful to place Congress’s handling of its war and budgetary
authority in a distinct analytic category to highlight the constitutional
difficulties that attend these practices, it is less useful to maintain this separate
category in attempting to explain the practices. In other important areas of
governance, Congress grants wholesale authority to the President and agencies
to make national policy. Relatedly, when Congress appears to have legislated
with great specificity, agencies (and courts) often find “gaps” in the statutory
language that enable the agency to refocus public programs to achieve policies
favored by the administration, and Congress usually remains mute. This is the
“delegation” problem, but it bears a close family relation with Dr. Fisher’s
description of abdication. Dr. Fisher is unconcerned with this sort of
Congressional behavior, because in his view this practice, unlike abdication of
war and budgetary authority, is “necessary.”
I do not disagree with Dr. Fisher’s conclusion, but the insistence upon
treating abdication as something different from and more serious than
“delegation” remains troubling. Legal considerations aside (most forms of
delegation are not treated as raising colorable constitutional issues),10 it is not
self-evident that we should be more concerned with Congress’s response to
presidential exercises of war and budgetary authority than with Congress’s
willingness to hand over substantial lawmaking authority to the President and
agencies - or Congress’s acquiescence in Presidential or agency policy
initiatives - in other important areas of governance. Dr. Fisher’s concern about
congressional abdication is not that governmental powers are lying dormant in
7. Neal Devins, Abdication By Another Name: An Ode to Lou Fisher, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 65 (2000).
8. See Williams, supra note 2, at 1021-22.
9. Fisher, Stages, supra note 3, at 56-57.
10. But see Am. Trucking Ass’n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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the face of serious need for their exercise. Rather, his concern is that power is
being exercised by the wrong institution and that this practice lacks
constitutional integrity. His concern is about separation of powers and a
respect for the architecture of the Constitution. In general terms, Dr. Fisher
sees congressional abdication of war and spending powers as a threat to
“democracy and self-government.”11
These same concerns animate discussions of excessive delegations of
legislative power.12 Delegation yields a governing structure in which “[m]ost
public law is legislative in origin but administrative in content.”13 In short,
through delegation — a practice “hardly discernible from a reading of either
our eighteenth-century Constitution” — “we live in an administrative state.”14
Critics of delegation insist that Congress is constitutionally responsible for
setting the course of public policy and that the President and agencies are
obligated to adhere to that course, not to set sail in pursuit of policy objectives
of their own. On this view, the constitutional architecture, by placing
“legislative” power in the hands of Congress and creating “a single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure,”15 ensured that lawmaking
would be a deliberative process, subject to consensus among various
constituencies’ representatives: the local constituencies represented in the
House; the states represented in the Senate, and the nation as a whole
represented by both houses and the presidency. Critics of delegation insist that
the practice subverts this constitutional arrangement, with untoward effects on
the public weal.16 Delegation, on this view, raises the “constitutional
problem . . . that Congress has not fulfilled its constitutional responsibilities.”17
Jerry Mashaw, an acknowledged advocate of delegation,18 summarizes
these concerns:
The everyday, numerical, and experiential dominance of administrative over
legislative and judicial lawmaking seems both unavoidable and troubling.
Unavoidable because as we have demanded more from government we have
necessarily demanded more administrators to carry out the programs and
policies adopted. Troubling because administrative governance affronts our
11. Fisher, Stages, supra note 3, at 7.
12. These concerns are classically expressed in THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF
LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (1979).
13. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 106 (1997).
14. Id.
15. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439-40 (1998) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
16. For a summary of these concerns, see Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 315, 319-21 (2000).
17. Ernest Gellhorn, Returning to First Principles, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 345, 347 (1987).
18. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985).
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common understanding of how American democracy is supposed to
operate. . . . Citizens . . . wonder what it means to have a “democracy” run
importantly by unknown, “faceless” bureaucrats . . . .19

In a more vigorous and sustained manner, David Schoenbrod charges that
“delegation undercuts democracy, undoes the Constitution’s most
comprehensive protection of liberty, and ultimately makes government less
effective in achieving the popular purposes of regulatory statutes.”20
Delegation, on this view, allows lawmakers to “fool us and . . . to mortgage the
nation’s future to prolong their own time in power.”21 Schoenbrod is not alone
in drawing such grave conclusions about delegation.22
If delegation may credibly be viewed as posing such dangers to our
constitutional form of government, it is different from abdication only by
degree, not by kind or effect. Indeed, for some, delegation is synonymous with
abdication. Theodore Lowi dramatically describes broad delegations as “the
voluntary, self-conscious rendering of legislative power to the President,
thence to the agencies in the executive branch” and as something perhaps even
more serious than abdication. For Lowi, delegation is “legiscide.”23
There are, of course, those who defend delegation on pragmatic,
democratic, and constitutional grounds.24 My purpose here is not to travel that
well-worn path of debate — though I agree with the proponents of delegation
— but simply to demonstrate that delegation shares critical features with, and
raises the same concerns as, the arguably more extreme congressional behavior
of abdication. To understand why Congress abdicates, we will also have to
understand why Congress delegates. Both practices signal an unwillingness or
inability on the part of Congress to assert its constitutional authority, preferring
instead to pass that responsibility to the President and agencies. As an intuitive
matter, we should expect that the reasons for both behaviors are largely the
same.
19. MASHAW, supra note 13, at 107.
20. SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 14.
21. Id. at 20.
22. See, e.g., Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and
Administrative Power, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295 (1987); Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of
Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982); Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, &
Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982).
23. Lowi, supra note 22, at 299.
24. See MASHAW, supra note 13; Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the
Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1992); David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran
conclude that “Congress does not delegate wholesale to the Executive,” and that the delegation
that does occur is desirable from a governance perspective. David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran,
The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 985 (1999); For the view that arguments against delegation on grounds
that it is undemocratic are vacuous — a point to which I am sympathetic — see Dan M. Kahan,
Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 795 (1999).
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II. INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AND INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES:
REPRESENTATION, DELEGATION, AND ABDICATION
A simple, straightforward explanation for delegation/abdication is that
Congress is doing nothing more than supplying the public with what it has
demanded. This explanation is premised on the obvious: Members of
Congress are forced to respond to constituent demands or face the prospect of
losing their jobs.
As Madison put it in discussing the House of
Representatives, legislators have “an immediate dependence on, and an
intimate sympathy with, the people.”25 Absent some convincing evidence that
the electoral system is subject to some rather severe malfunctioning due
uniquely to delegation and/or abdication, it is difficult, or at least counterintuitive to suggest that congressional abdication and delegation are
“undemocratic.” If that is so, one would expect that the turnover rate in
Congresses that have chosen to abdicate or delegate broadly would be very
high indeed. As to potential malfunctioning within the electoral system, we
can acknowledge that a variety of collective action problems and corrupt
practices may permit legislators to act in ways that a majority of their
constituents disfavor.26 There is, however, no persuasive reason to expect that
those problems are more acute in a regime where delegation and abdication are
the norm than in a regime where they do not obtain.
Professor Schoenbrod, does suggest that delegation enables legislators to
hoodwink the voting public, presenting them with claims of accomplishments
and responsibility that are basically vacuous.27 This effect, if true,
demonstrates a malfunctioning of the electoral system the causative factor of
which is delegation, distinguishing this factor from other problematic
collection action scenarios. One can appreciate Professor Schoenbrod’s efforts
to bring delegation into the spotlight, encouraging public scrutiny and
deliberation about this practice. But his argument against delegation on this
point simply proves too much. If Schoenbrod is right that Congress can fool
the public through delegation — and there are no strong reasons for believing
that it can — his argument is, at best, a bit awkward. If the public lacks the
sophistication or interest to scrutinize legislators’ claims, it is not at all clear
that, if this is democracy, we should want any part of it.
As Schoenbrod himself acknowledges, “We can refuse to reelect
legislators who make laws we dislike.”28 Thus, an engaged public that is

25. THE FEDERALIST, NO. 51, at 163 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison) (The
University of Chicago ed., 1952).
26. The literature on collective action problems is vast. The generative text is MANCUR
OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
(1965).
27. SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 14.
28. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION

81

dissatisfied with broad forms of delegation can simply select legislators who
will refuse to engage in such practices. Mashaw puts this point nicely:
A decision to go forward notwithstanding continuing ambiguity or
disagreement about the details of implementation is a decision that the polity is
better off legislating generally than maintaining the status quo. Citizens may
disagree, but they can also hold legislators accountable for their choice. If
citizens want more specific statutes, or fear that legislating without serious
agreement on implementing details is dangerous, they can, after all, throw the
bums out.29

An unengaged, ill-informed electorate may unwittingly dislike delegation and
be unable to see it. This environment would free legislators from the discipline
of accountability. As I shall explain below, however, there is no reason to
expect that the type of legislative behavior preferred by Schoenbrod would
increase legislative accountability or lead to more informed decisions by the
electorate. But assuming Schoenbrod is right, we could simply conclude that
the electorate is getting no more or no less than what it bargained for. As a
prima facie matter, I am unwilling to assign such ignorance or incapacity to the
public, preferring a more beneficent view of the electorate’s capacities for
understanding legislative choice, including the choice to delegate power
broadly or to abdicate authority entirely.30 Prima facie, then, delegation is
practiced as a congressional response to public demand.
The idea that congressional behavior may be explained as a function of
constituent demand is the basic idea that informs public choice theory.31 The
29. MASHAW, supra note 13, at 146-47; see also id. at 139 (quoting JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 134 (1980)):
The . . . demand for legislative decision making as a prerequisite to accountability is . . .
incomplete. . . . I find it difficult to understand why we do not presently have exactly the
“clowns . . . we deserve.” The dynamics of accountability apparently involve voters
willing to vote upon the basis of their representative’s record in the legislature. Assuming
that our current representatives in the legislature vote for laws that contain vague
delegations of authority, we are presumably holding them accountable for that at the polls.
How is it that we are not being represented?
30. An interesting problem for those who would introduce the problem of “democracy” in
support of or against delegation/abdication is the apparent lack of interest in self-rule by the
voting public. One source reports that “fewer than half of voting-age citizens take part in House
elections in presidential years and fewer than 40 percent vote in off years.” ROGER H. DAVIDSON
& WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 97 (6th ed. 1998).
31. See Daniel A. Farger & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX.
L. REV. 873 (1987), reprinted in part in MAXWELL STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW:
READINGS AND COMMENTARY 5, 16 (1997):
The core of the [public choice] models is a revised view of legislative behavior. In place
of their prior assumption that legislators voted to promote their view of the public interest,
[public choice scholars] now postulate that legislators are motivated solely by selfinterest. In particular, legislators must maximize their likelihood of reelection. A
legislator who is not reelected loses all the other possible benefits flowing from office.
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theory is that, as a matter of rational choice, legislators will act in ways that
maximize their preferences, with the dominant preference being a desire for
reelection.32 Importantly, the basic unit of analysis for this theory is the
individual legislator, not the institutional Congress. Note also, that in order to
have explanatory value, the theory does not require that every member’s
preference for reelection will dominate that member’s other preferences —
e.g., a preference for fiscal responsibility. Rather, and because Congress acts
collectively, the theory will be useful so long as members’ aggregated
preferences for reelection dominate over members’ other aggregated
preferences.
Given this structure of incentives facing members of Congress, we are
faced with the distinct prospect that legislators may act in ways that promote
their own electoral fortunes while jeopardizing the functional role of the
institution as a whole. This result will obtain in circumstances where the
action that advances individual legislators’ interests in reelection and the action
that advances institutional interests are not the same.
The rather vast literature on Congress tends to support the conclusion that
individual and institutional interests will often diverge. For example, in their
useful work, Congress and its Members, Roger Davidson and Walter Oleszek,
devote a lot of space to explicating a Burkean “two Congresses” thesis.33 One
functional Congress “act[s] as a collegial body, performing constitutional
The other serves as “the
duties and debating legislative issues.”34
representative assemblage of 540 individuals.”35 Davidson and Oleszek
conclude that “the Constitution and subsequent historical developments affirm
Congress’s dual functions of lawmaker and representative assembly. Although
the roles are tightly bound together, they nonetheless impose separate duties
and functions.”36 While acknowledging that members’ duties to respond to the
insistent demands of voters and constituents is “not specifically spelled out in
the Constitution,” Davidson and Oleszek rightly conclude that “these duties
flow from the constitutional provisions for electing representatives and
senators.”37
The important insight here is that “[t]he electoral fortunes of its members
depend less upon what Congress produces as an institution than upon the

32. For a brief discussion of this model, including its shortcomings, see Williams, supra note
2, at 1035-44.
33. DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 30, at 1-37; see also Aranson et al., supra note 22, at
43 (discussing “fundamental tension between a legislator’s role as a delegate of narrow interests
and his role as a trustee for his district and for the nation”).
34. DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 30, at 4.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id. at 5-6.
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support and goodwill of voters hundreds or thousands of miles away.”38
Mashaw puts the point more directly. To voters choosing a representative,
“the congressperson’s position on various issues of national interest is of
modest, if any importance. The only question is, Does he or she ‘bring home
the bacon.’”39
When voter support and goodwill can be nurtured by actions that are in
derogation of Congress’s institutional interests, public choice theory predicts
that legislators will generally choose to abandon institutional concerns in order
to promote their individual interest in reelection. In fact, the disjunction
between individual incentives and institutional interests may be such that, for
members, it “dictates a strategy of opening as much space as possible between
themselves and ‘those other politicians’ back in Washington” — namely, the
Congress as an institution.40 Or, as Richard Fenno aptly concludes, members
will “run for Congress by running against Congress.”41
Although this conclusion seems to point to a potential problem of
governance, we should not rush from this consequence to the additional
conclusion that it is inconsistent with the Constitution. The Constitution does
not require Congress to act wisely or in ways that promote the provision of
public goods over the provision of private goods. Rather, the Constitution
structures exercises of power in ways that the framers hoped would promote
public-regarding outcomes over private-regarding ones.42 Recall that the
Constitution was designed in part on the Madisonian premise that effective
governments are those that are structured in ways that make use of, rather than
attempt to suppress, the self-interest of individual political leaders.43 But just
as importantly, as Davidson and Oleszek make clear, the reason that individual
interests may hamper institutional capacities is that the Constitution structures
the legislative branch in ways that permit — indeed, encourage — such results.
As I have suggested elsewhere, the framers may have been insufficiently
attentive to the institutional effects of self-interested behavior in fashioning
their constitutional blueprint.44 On the other hand, the provisions of Article I
suggest (or at least support) precisely the opposite conclusion — namely, that
the framers understood that the electoral demands placed on members would
often require individual responses that diverged from the interests of the
institution as a whole. They may very well have been familiar with Burke’s
38. Id. at 4-5.
39. MASHAW, supra note 13, at 152.
40. DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 30, at 7-8.
41. RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 168
(1978).
42. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29 (1985).
43. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 25, at 163.
44. Williams, supra note 2, at 1016.
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speech in Bristol in 1774, elaborating the dual character of representative
government. Burke described a popularly elected legislature both as “a
Congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests
each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and
advocates,” and as “a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest,
that of the whole — where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to
guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.”45
Perhaps less obviously, the framers may have realized that frequent elections
would force members to consider carefully the electoral consequences of their
actions. As a result, members’ individual interests would serve as a sort of
internal hedge against the tendencies of legislatures to dominate the political
arena, lessening the threat of legislative tyranny with which the federalist
framers were so clearly concerned.46 While entirely speculative, it may very
well be that in structuring Congress, the framers recognized that individual and
institutional interests would, at times, diverge and provided incentives that
permit individual interests to dominate precisely to ensure that Congress would
not become too powerful.
In any event, delegation and abdication are the predictable results of the
institutional design, for this behavior is, in a number of ways, broadly
consistent with the general tendency of legislators to prefer actions that
advance individual interests over institutional ones. First, and perhaps most
obvious, delegation and abdication do not demand nearly as much knowledge
or information about the pertinent issues as is required to enact detailed, rulelike legislation (at least if members deem it important to understand the effects
of and reasons for their votes). As a consequence, by abdicating or delegating,
members avoid the costs of obtaining and understanding information. Not
only does this reduce the sheer workload of legislators, it also becomes an
effective strategy for dealing with the vast uncertainties — both in terms of
actual policy effects and political repercussions — that accompany many
45. Edmund Burke, Speech to Electors at Bristol, in BURKE’S POLITICS (Ross J.S. Hoffman
& Paul Levack, eds. 1949), quoted in DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 30, at 12.
46. It is widely understood that the Federalist framers feared powerful legislatures. Madison
expressed this concern explicitly. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 157 (James Madison) (The
University of Chicago ed., 1952) (“The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere
of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.”); see id. (“[I]t is against the
enterprising ambition of [the legislative] department that the people ought to indulge all their
jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 25, at
163:
In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy
for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render
them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected
with each other as the nature of their common functions and their dependence on the
society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments
by still further precautions.
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forms of regulatory action.47 An added benefit is that delegation, by
minimizing the need for information, frees up scarce resources that members
may devote to constituent services believed to be more directly relevant to the
members’ electoral prospects.48
Second, delegation enables members to mediate disputes among
conflicting constituent groups without coming down strongly on one side or
the other. Broad delegations often funnel the conflict over the distribution of
benefits and burdens in public programs from the legislative to the
administrative forum, in which incremental adjustments can be made that tend
to lessen the hardships experienced by those who “lose” the battle for benefits
and burdens.49 Mashaw notes, for example, that broad delegations facilitate
both temporal and situational variances in regulatory requirements that may
better account for the actual effects of regulation than is possible through
legislation that eliminates the possibility of such variances by tightly
constraining administrative discretion.50 In this manner, legislators may
minimize the chances of alienating important constituents and thus increase
their chances of reelection. More generally, and especially when coupled with
uncertainty about the effects of various policy choices, “with greater . . .
conflict there is a stronger incentive for Congress to pass the hot potato to the
agency by broadening the scope and instruments of delegated authority.”51
Third, broad delegation may permit legislators to exert influence over the
implementation of delegated authority in ways that would likely be much more
difficult in a regime of more rule-like legislation.52 This influence may
frequently service particular constituents’ interests, enabling members to gain
visible credit and shift blame in ways that might be unlikely without abdication
or delegation at the institutional level.53 As McCubbins and Schwartz argue,
congressional oversight is less costly to members and more effective, in terms
of electoral prospects, when undertaken in response to specific complaints
about administrative action voiced by important constituents than when
conducted systematically.54 To the extent that broad delegations enable
47. Mathew D. McCubbins & Talbot Page, A Theory of Congressional Delegation, in
CONGRESS: STRUCTURE & POLICY 409, 416-18 (Mathew D. McCubbins & Talbot Page eds.,
1987).
48. See Aranson et al., supra note 22, at 21-2. Epstein and O’Halloran conclude that
delegation tends to get broader as the issues become more complex. Epstein & O’Halloran, supra
note 24, at 984. (“[A]s issue areas become more informationally intense, no matter how
information is measured, more authority is delegated. . .”).
49. Aranson et al., supra note 22, at 33, 39.
50. Mashaw, Prodelegation, supra note 18.
51. McCubbins & Page, supra note 47, at 419.
52. Aranson et al., supra note 22, at 58.
53. Id.
54. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE & POLICY 426, 429 (1987).
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administrators to exercise the flexibility to respond to legislators’ inquiries in
ways that reduce friction between the agency and legislators, such delegations
enhance legislators’ effectiveness in dealing with constituents’ complaints,
directly increasing the likelihood of electoral success.
Fourth, delegation may permit legislators to take action in response to
public demand for legislation in circumstances where, if precise statutory
standards were required, conflicts among legislators themselves might yield a
stalemate, preventing Congress as an institution from taking any action at all.55
In this fashion, legislators can avoid the charge of being part of a “do-nothing”
institution.
Finally, we should not discount the possibility that delegation may be
viewed by legislators (and the public) as an appropriate institutional response
to serve important public interests:
[C]onsider a fairly complex policy area — say, airline safety — in which
legislators are confident that the regulator’s policy goals are nearly identical to
their own. Delegating under such circumstances with broad discretion would
result in outcomes close to those preferred by legislators and, by transitivity, to
those preferred by their constituents as well. . . . In contrast, forcing Congress
to provide a detailed policy algorithm may result in the regulator’s having to
implement policy that neither she nor the legislators in the enacting coalition
would have preferred. True, a good algorithm will deliver good policy, but
relatively uninformed legislators may not even possess sufficient expertise to
be sure that their road map will lead to the desired destination, rather than a
dead end.56

Empirical surveys support the more general conclusion that the breadth of
delegated power “increases when it better suits legislators’ need for reelection,
and it decreases when legislative policymaking becomes politically more
efficient.”57
The incentives favoring abdication in matters involving war are somewhat
different, but basically follow the same logic.58
The framers did not clearly seek to check these incentives by including an
express prohibition against delegation. Indeed, the sweeping clause, providing
congressional authority “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution” powers conferred by the Constitution, may
plausibly be viewed as textual evidence of an apparent unconcern for express
statutory delegation.59 From an historical perspective, delegation has been a
55. Id.
56. Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 24, at 986-87.
57. Id. at 985.
58. See Williams, supra note 2, at 1015-16.
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see generally William Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress
in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the
Horizontal Effect of the “Sweeping Clause,” 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 788 (1975).
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rather consistent approach to achieving public policy objectives.60 From a
normative perspective, delegation raises complex issues, but it does not suffice
to declare the practice “undemocratic” and move quickly to the conclusion that
a strong judicial stance against the practice is warranted. These considerations
are addressed in Part IV.
III. LEGAL THEORY AND THE DECLINE OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY
To this point, I have argued that Congress will tend to delegate/abdicate
constitutional authority in response to public demand, measured in terms of
how individual legislators believe prospects for reelection are affected by the
various choices they face in exercising the authority of their offices. In this
part, I will argue that legal theory has contributed to the shift in power from the
Congress to the presidency and the bureaucracy.
A.

Expansion of National Legislative Power Contributes to the Erosion of
Congressional Authority

The primary complaint of those who view delegation/abdication as a
constitutional impropriety is that it corrupts the political process by enabling
legislators to confer private benefits at public expense61 or that it facilitates
national action by shortcutting the constitutionally-prescribed process for
reaching a consensus on the need for such action.62 Those who share these
views often argue that a rigorous, judicially enforced ban on broad delegations,
while now largely a constitutional anachronism,63 (will redress) to these
concerns.
Then-Justice Rehnquist summarized the functions of the
nondelegation doctrine in Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst.,64 noting:
[T]he nondelegation doctrine serves three important functions. First, and most
abstractly, it ensures to the extent consistent with orderly government
administration that important choices of social policy are made in Congress,
the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular will. . . .
Second, the doctrine guarantees that. To the extent Congress finds it necessary
to delegate authority, it provides the recipient of that authority with an
‘intelligible principle’ to guide the exercise of the delegated discretion. . . .
Third, and derivative of the second, the doctrine ensures that courts charged

60. See, e.g., Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813)
(upholding delegation to the President to impose trade restrictions); see generally Sunstein, supra
note 16, at 322 (“[T]he practice of early congresses strongly suggests that broad grants of
authority to the executive were not thought to be problematic.”).
61. See Aranson et al., supra note 22, at 37-63.
62. SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 117-18; Fisher, Stages, supra note 3, at 51-55.
63. But see American Trucking Ass’n, 175 F.3d at 1027 (holding that the EPA’s
interpretation of the Clean Air Act effected an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power).
64. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
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with reviewing the exercise of delegated legislative discretion will be able to
test that exercise against ascertainable standards.65

In my view, pinning hopes on the delegation doctrine to service these functions
misses the mark or is, at the least, incomplete, masks other important factors,
and fails to account for the current administrative law system.
I start from an obvious premise. The scope of permissible delegation is a
function not only of the constraints imposed by a nondelegation principle, but
also of how much authority Congress itself enjoys. Put slightly differently,
even if Congress could delegate without constraint, it could only delegate such
authority as the institution itself may exercise. The more power Congress has,
the more power it may delegate. In my view, opponents of delegation — at
least those of a decidedly conservative cast (and most are) — are aiming at the
wrong target, with the result that their arguments against delegation mask the
object of their jealousy. To take a very simple example, Schoenbrod uses the
Clean Air Act as an example to support the sweeping conclusion that
“‘American public bureaucracy is not designed to be effective,’ but rather to
advance the interests of ‘those who exercise political power.’”66 But in order
to so advance such interests, it would be necessary, first, to conclude that
Congress - and derivatively, the bureaucracy, pursuant to delegation — was
vested with constitutional authority to regulate activities that contribute to air
pollution. More specifically, it is necessary to conclude that the Clean Air Act
— and virtually every other statute administered by an agency — is an
appropriate exercise of Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce.
While that conclusion now seems hardly worth questioning, even
considering the Court’s recent, more restrictive reading of the commerce
clause,67 it was not always so. Indeed, prior to the expansive interpretation of
the commerce clause that has been used to sustain the administrative state, it is
likely that the courts would have treated the Clean Air Act as beyond the scope
of congressional power, even if the delegation were deemed to be otherwise
appropriate.68 It seems clear, however, that broad delegations and legislation
resting on expansive interpretations of the commerce clause go hand in hand.
Indeed, in the most famous delegation case, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, the Court concluded that the National Industrial Recovery Act,
permitting the formulation of “codes of fair competition,” was both an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and beyond congressional

65. Id. at 685-86 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
66. SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 81 (quoting Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic
Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN 26 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds.,
1989)).
67. See, e,g, United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
68. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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authority under the commerce clause.69 Moreover, tellingly, despite an
occasional lawsuit raising delegation issues — all of which were
unsuccessful70 — there apparently was virtually no mention of a “delegation
problem” prior to the massive expansion of federal power that began with the
New Deal.
Had the Court adhered to the views expressed in Schechter, E.C. Knight,
and like cases — namely, that “[c]ommerce succeeds to manufacture and is not
part of it,”71 and that Congress may only assert its authority over activities that
are actually in interstate commerce or that “directly affect” interstate
commerce72 — the scope of congressional power would have remained rather
severely limited and the subject matter of many of the existing regulatory
programs would remain within the province of state and local governments.
The opportunities for members of Congress to confer private (and public)
benefits through delegation or otherwise would correspondingly be limited.
Paradoxically, by increasing the opportunities for members to deliver benefits
to their constituents, the courts’ expansion of congressional authority under the
commerce clause also increased the opportunities for Congress to give away
that authority through abdication/delegation.
I do not want to claim too much for this effect of legal doctrine, for even
under restrictive readings of congressional powers, the potential reach of
federal administrative regulatory programs remained fairly extensive.73
Nonetheless, the effect is likely substantial and correlates well with other
features that make delegation likely. First, the pre-New Deal interpretations of
the commerce clause, combined with interpretations of the due process clause,
did not prevent substantial amounts of regulation (with attendant delegation),
but it placed certain sorts of regulation beyond congressional cognizance.
Complex divisions of the world into “national” and “local,” as well as “public”
and “private” spheres yielded the conclusion that much of the nation’s

69. 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
70. Schoenbrod cites three pre-New Deal cases, claiming that in each the Court struck down
statutes “on the ground that they delegated legislative power.” SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at
34-5 (discussing United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921); Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Washington v. W.C. Dawson, 264 U.S. 219 (1924)). This
reading of the cases is to some extent correct, but none of the cases involved delegation to the
President or to administrative agencies. Accordingly, they raise concerns that lie outside the
scope of this essay.
71. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 12. For a thorough review of the cases, see Barry Cushman, A
Stream of Legal Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Doctrine from Swift to Jones &
Laughlin, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 105 (1992).
72. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 547-48.
73. See, e.g., Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States; Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (The Shreveport Rate Cases).
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economic activity would be off-limits to federal regulation.74 As Charles
Schultze notes, “[e]ven as late as the middle 1950s the federal government had
a major regulatory responsibility in only four areas: antitrust, financial
institutions, transportation, and communications.”75 Now, these areas of
federal regulation have taken a backseat to extensive regulation concerning
health, safety, and the environment, subjecting all but the smallest and most
local forms of economic activity to extensive legal requirements. With this
expanding responsibility comes the need for delegation.
Second, with the rise of new subject matters for regulation came the need
to develop new forms of regulation. The nature of the problems addressed by
newer areas of regulation differs radically from those contained within the
“national, public” sphere of pre-New Deal jurisprudence.
The single most important characteristic of the newer forms of [regulation] is
that their success depends on affecting the skills, attitudes, consumption habits,
or production patterns of hundreds of millions of individuals, millions of
business firms, and thousands of local units of government. . . . The
boundaries of the ‘public administration’ problem have leapt far beyond the
question of how to effectively organize and run a public institution and now
encompass the far more vexing question of how to change some aspect of the
behavior of a whole society.76

The combination of more opportunities for regulation, coupled with the type of
regulation demanded, ensured that delegation would not only be desirable in
some cases, but necessary to carry the federal presence into the places to be
regulated. Insisting that federal regulation take the form of statutory rules to
be enforced by courts with little involvement by agencies — save, perhaps, a
prosecutorial function — seems not only improbable, but a recipe for
bureaucratizing the courts to a much greater degree than they currently are.
It misses the point to argue that “Congress has enough time to make the
laws,” making delegation unnecessary.77 Arguments of this sort typically rest
on the claim that extensive federal regulation simply is not called for — state
regulation and markets will do the job nicely and more efficiently.78 Even if
this is right — a questionable conclusion, to be sure79 — it is not an argument
against delegation, but instead an argument for pre-New Deal commerce
clause jurisprudence.
For example, Schoenbrod, who advances these
74. See Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2000).
75. CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 7 (1977).
76. Id. at 12.
77. SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 135-52.
78. Id. at 136-142.
79. See generally Douglas R. Williams, Cooperative Federalism and the Clean Air Act: A
Defense of Uniform Federal Regulation, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring
2001).
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arguments against delegation, concedes that “[g]overnment cannot manage
industries without delegation.”80 But it is management of industries (or at least
many of the negative externalities they generate) that is precisely what is
required by many of the newer forms of regulation.
Faulting the courts for not applying a vigorous “nondelegation doctrine”
fails for want of appropriate principles that will not simultaneously impose a
judicial constraint on Congress’s ability fully to exercise its constitutional
authority, as interpreted by post-New Deal courts.81 That is, if we deem it
constitutionally appropriate for the federal government to regulate the subject
matters it currently does, delegation, often very broad, is the inevitable result.
Consider in this respect, the Court’s decision in Industrial Union
Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute,82 commonly known as
the Benzene case. A plurality of the Court concluded that Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) had impermissibly interpreted a statute to
require the agency to impose strict limits on the extent of toxic chemical
exposures — in this case, benzene — experienced by employees without a
prior finding that existing exposure levels posed a “significant risk” to the
employees’ health. The agency concluded that exposure to benzene was linked
to certain forms of cancer, but could not identify a level at which the linkage
between exposure and cancer could be definitively ruled out — that is, benzene
is a pollutant that exhibits no “threshold” level below which risks to human
health can be confidently ruled out. On the agency’s view, once this risk to
health had been identified, whether “significant” or otherwise, the statute
mandated that the risk be eliminated or reduced to the extent “feasible.” The
Court viewed this interpretation of OSHA’s statutory authority as much too
expansive.
The Court’s decision in Benzene is perhaps sensible, but its reasoning is
confounding. The Court opined that if the agency was right about what the
statute required, the legislation would grant the agency such sweeping
authority over American industry that it would constitute an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.83 But this is an incorrect, or at least highly
novel, reading of the nondelegation doctrine. It shifts the ground of concern
from the question whether Congress had resolved the important policy
questions when it enacted the statute to the question whether the extent of
regulation would too severely disrupt the economic status quo. If the agency
80. Id. at 140.
81. See Peter H. Schnuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 792-93 (1999) (Vigorous nondelegation doctrine is “a prescription for
judicial supervision of both the substance and forms of legislation and hence of politics and
public policy, without the existence of even the possibility of any coherent, principled, or
manageable judicial standards.”).
82. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
83. Id. at 646.
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was right that the statute mandated the result it reached, the legislation would
not be unconstitutional for want of a limiting statutory mandate that effectively
constrained the agency’s policy choices. It would simply represent a choice by
Congress to exercise its commerce powers in an extraordinarily aggressive
manner, based on the premise that health risks to American workers should be
reduced wherever feasible, regardless of the relationship between the gains in
health protection and the costs of achieving such gains. The problem in
Benzene was not one of delegated “legislative” power, but of delegated
“administrative” power to work the legislative will. This is not a problem to
which the nondelegation doctrine is responsive; it is a problem — if at all —
associated with the scope of Congress’s substantive legislative jurisdiction.
The Court’s invocation of the nondelegation doctrine to substitute its own, far
narrower reading of the agency’s statutory authority for that offered by the
agency masks this, more likely basis for judicial concern about the agency’s
actions.
Critics of delegation are also strangely unattentive to other ways in which
administrative discretion can have significant impacts on policy. We enjoy a
common law system in which nice adjustments to legal obligations are made
by distinguishing factual predicates. In light of that practice, it is unlikely that
a reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine would squeeze discretion out of the
system. It is much more likely that the discretion would be shifted from the
(usually) highly visible and indirectly accountable (via presidential
accountability) agency proceedings to less visible prosecutorial processes and
largely unaccountable judicial processes. It is hardly clear that, given the
enormous discretion enjoyed by prosecutors84 and the courts — particularly on
matters of remedy85 — that a vigorous nondelegation doctrine would
accomplish any of its recognized purposes.
Once the expansive powers of Congress were released from the shackles of
limiting judicial interpretation, it is not surprising that the delegation doctrine
fell into desuetude. If the only effective limits on the matters to which
congressional authority extends were those imposed by electoral constraints, a
“substantial effects” linkage to interstate commerce, and a flimsy “rational
basis” standard of review,86 why should the courts, on the basis of nothing
more than a debatable constitutional inference, attempt to contain this power
by invoking delegation principles? How were courts to distinguish the
question of whether Congress had made sufficiently specific policy choices in

84. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
85. See Weinberger v. Romerco-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[R]egulatory
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional
unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis.”).
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delegating power to agencies from the question of whether the subject matter
of the legislation was appropriate for federal intervention? Benzene shows that
the questions may be quite difficult to keep analytically separate. But even if
the delegation doctrine were capable of being confined to an inquiry
concerning whether Congress had made sufficiently clear policy choices, how
are courts to discern the range of possible policy options, much less whether
the legislative choice was “specific”?87
Rather than viewing delegation as an evasion of congressional
responsibility, broad delegations of authority to administrative institutions
might be explained, at least in part, as a responsible congressional choice to
extend the reach of federal power to deal with pressing social and economic
problems. A charge of “abdication” on the part of Congress for such
responses would seem misplaced.
B.

The Routinization of Administrative Law and the Ascendance of
Administrative Authority.

Aside from broadly interpreting Congress’s constitutional authority, and
thus inviting Congress to delegate broadly, the courts (with legislative
assistance) have developed a now fairly routinized body of administrative law
to review the exercises of discretionary power by the President, when acting
through agencies,88 as well as exercises of such discretion by agencies pursuant
to direct legislative grants of authority. The effects of such review upon
Congress’s willingness to delegate broadly are difficult to discern as an
empirical matter. Nonetheless, there is some intuitive appeal to Judge
Leventhal’s observation in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA: “Congress has been willing to
delegate its legislative powers broadly — and courts have upheld such
delegation — because there is court review to assure that the agency exercises
the delegated power within statutory limits, and that it fleshes out objectives
within those limits by an administration that is not irrational or
discriminatory.”89
Subject to the fairly recent innovations discussed below, legal theory thus
treats administrative action more as implementation than invention. Under
highly elastic standards of review such as the Administrative Procedure Act’s
“substantial evidence” and “arbitrary and capricious” standards, the courts
have encouraged Congress and the public to treat administrative action as
subject to the rule of law, and not as policy development and implementation

87. On this view, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(nondelegation doctrine not susceptible to judicial enforcement); Richard B. Stewart, Beyond
Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 324-28 (1987).
88. The authority of the courts to review exercises of presidential discretion remains
somewhat limited. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994).
89. 541 F.2d 1, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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in which political considerations hold sway. Moreover, Congress has become
quite adept at loading up with exacting procedural requirements statutes
otherwise containing broad grants of discretion. Such procedural requirements
make the exercise of agency power quite cumbersome, and may be an effective
means of controlling administrative discretion.
A prime example of this approach is the EPA’s authority to regulate
chemicals under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).90 Two examples
of the agency’s attempt to implement this statute are telling. McCubbins and
Page offer this anecdote:
Under section 4 of the act, EPA must promulgate test rules for those chemicals
that it requires to be tested. Such tests are used to generate information about
the health and environmental effects of the new chemical. The chemical
manufacturing firms have to pay for the tests. Procedural safeguards were put
into TSCA to prevent EPA from requiring tests that were redundant or did not
produce useful information. Indeed, in the case of one of EPA’s first
“priority” chemicals, chloromethane, these procedural requirements were
interpreted so strictly by the agency that it spent several hundred thousand
dollars and several years writing the test rule . . . . The cost of writing a rule
requiring testing was several times the cost of performing the test.91

Under section 6 of the same statute, EPA engaged in a ten-year effort to
develop a record sufficient to support a phased ban of asbestos-containing
products, only to be met with a judicial conclusion that the agency had not
jumped through all the hoops Congress had placed in the path of effective
regulation.92
These examples illustrate that broad delegations of substantive authority do
not necessarily yield an environment in which agencies enjoy broad, unfettered
discretion. They also provide a sense of the effects on agency decision making
of the propensity of courts to scrutinize closely agency action for procedural
shortcomings. This form of review, what Jerry Mashaw describes as
“proceduralized rationality review,”93 is a staple of modern administrative
law.94 Faced with judicial demands to explain their actions in exacting detail
and to respond to comments from the public, it is not unusual for notices of
final rulemakings to run to tens and sometimes hundreds of pages in the
Federal Register. Agencies have become familiar with judicial demands and
have structured their decision making processes in ways that minimize the
opportunities for successful judicial challenges. Knowing this, Congress can

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

15 U.S.C. §§ 2601- 92 (1994).
McCubbins & Page, supra note 47, at 418.
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1229 (5th Cir. 1991).
MASHAW, supra note 13, at 178.
See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION

95

structure its delegations in ways that avoid taking sides on controversial issues,
but nonetheless impose significant constraints on agencies.95
Because the well-developed system of judicial review now functions as
both an internal and external check on agency decision making processes, it
has largely supplanted the need for a nondelegation doctrine, at least with
respect to two of the three functions typically assigned to the doctrine —
namely, cabining administrative discretion and ensuring meaningful judicial
review. Indeed, in modern incantations of the nondelegation dotrine, it is these
two concerns that have purportedly justified its continued application. In
American Trucking Association, Inc. v. EPA,96 the D.C. Circuit invoked the
nondelegation doctrine to hold that EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act
violated the nondelegation doctrine not because Congress had legislated too
broadly, but instead because the agency had failed to impose upon its statutory
authority a constraining construction that effectively provided determinate
limits on the agency’s discretion.97 The court acknowledged that this sort of
application of the nondelegation doctrine did not ensure that Congress makes
important policy choices, but expressed little or no concern with that
consequence.98
The decision in American Trucking is dubious, if for no other reason than
that it invokes constitutional law to yield a conclusion that could be supported
independently on non-constitutional grounds — namely, a standard application
of limiting administrative law principles. Indeed, it seems quite clear that the
decision simply substitutes a constitutional howitzer for what could have been
accomplished with an administrative law pea-shooter. To expand upon a
concept recently advanced by Professor Sunstein — who argues that
nondelegation principles inform several canons of construction that deny to
agencies decisional authority over certain matters99 — we might credibly view
our administrative law system as an effective substitute for two of the three
95. On the interplay between broad substantive delegations and procedural requirements, see
generally McCubbins & Page, supra note 47; Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies,
75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987).
96. 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
97. Id. at 1034. For a general discussion of the shift in the nondelegation doctrine from an
emphasis on whether Congress has made the important policy choices to an emphasis on
controlling administrative discretion, see ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 36-39 (1993). See also Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F.
Supp. 737, 758 (D.D.C. 1971) (concluding that legislation did not violate nondelegation doctrine
because “however broad the discretion of the Executive at the outset, the standards once
developed [by the agency] limit the latitude of subsequent executive action,” thus satisfying “rule
of law” concerns associated with the nondelegation doctrine).
98. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 175 F.3d at 1038.
99. Sunstein, supra note 16, at 316.
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functions performed by the nondelegation doctrine. This embryonic notion
needs further development, but space or time do not permit it here.
American Trucking’s lack of concern with Congress’s failure to make the
hard policy choices is broadly consistent with the work of the federal courts
over the past several decades. These courts have showed considerably more
sophistication about notions of accountability and democratic values. This is
manifested in the development of doctrine that views agency policymaking
neither as illegitimate nor as a matter of especial judicial concern.
The most dramatic example of this doctrinal pathway is the approach to
reviewing agency interpretations of law set forth in the Court’s decision in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.100 This decision
has been described as a decision that “dominates modern administrative
law.”101 Chevron holds that in reviewing agency action, courts must defer to
agency interpretations of their own authority in the absence of clear legislative
direction or unless the agency’s view is unreasonable.102 This is, as Professor
Sunstein notes, “an emphatically prodelegation canon, indeed it is the
quintessential prodelegation canon.”103
Remarkably, the Chevron Court perceived nothing akin to a delegation
problem in declaring that policy decisions are properly entrusted to
administrative agencies. In the Court’s words:
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities
may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies
are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the government to make such
policy choices - resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency
charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.104

Chevron thus underlines the centrality of administrative processes in projecting
the course of national regulatory policy, broadly affirming a broad shift in
authority from Congress to the Executive branch.105 Not only does it confirm
the legitimacy of delegation, but also de-links such legitimacy from Judge
Leventhal’s notion that delegation depends almost entirely on the effectiveness
of judicial review in cabining agency discretion. A new source of legitimacy
— presidential accountability — supplies the necessary comfort to inspire
judicial acceptance of broad delegations of power. This sentiment was echoed
100. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
101. Sunstein, supra note 16, at 329.
102. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
103. Sunstein, supra note 16, at 329.
104. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
105. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 510 (1989).
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in Sierra Club v. Costle.106 There, the court was unconcerned that it was
“possible that undisclosed Presidential prodding may direct an outcome . . .
different from the outcome that would have obtained in the absence of
Presidential involvement,” so long as the outcome could otherwise be defended
on the rulemaking record.107 Put another way, it is entirely legitimate that
agency decisions be premised on political considerations, not simply on the
application of “neutral” agency expertise in service of clearly articulated policy
choices made by Congress.108
In a like vein, the courts have eagerly expanded the range within which
administrative discretion may freely run riot. The chief doctrinal points of
departure for this expansion have been newly discovered content in the
“committed to agency discretion” exception to the Administrative Procedure
Act’s generous provisions for judicial review109 and “standing” requirements
offered up as interpretations of Article III of the Constitution’s requirement
that the judicial power extend only to “cases or controversies.”110 Combined,
these doctrinal commitments have yielded a small, but significant space within
which presidential and agency decisions may be made without fear of any
judicial scrutiny.
The maturation of administrative law has thus provided an environment in
which courts have made a general peace with broad congressional delegations
of authority. For the public, this visibile legitimation of delegation and
abdication have pushed the basic constitutional issues far into the background.
The resulting environment minimizes the costs of delegation for members of
Congress, creating incentives for continued adherence to the practice.
C. Restricting Congressional Control
At the same time that courts have become quite tolerant of Congress’s
penchant for broad delegations of authority to agencies, they have also been
considerably more intolerant of arrangements through which Congress has
attempted to retrieve or reassert some of the authority it has delegated. The
key decision in this respect is INS v. Chadha, in which the Court declared
unconstitutional a “legislative veto” provision contained in the Immigration
and Nationality Act.111 Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the Court walks a
fine line that decisively tilts in favor of delegation. The crux of the opinion
106. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
107. Id. at 408.
108. Id. (concluding that courts should not interpret their review powers in a way that would
demand that agency rulemakings be converted “into a rarified technocratic process, unaffected by
political considerations or the presence of Presidential power”).
109. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603
(1988); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 184 (1993).
110. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 556 (1992).
111. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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lies in the Court’s conclusion that the legislative veto exercised by the House
in that case “was essentially legislative in purpose and effect.”112 In other
words, the veto was an exercise of lawmaking power, the procedures for which
— bicameral approval and presentment to the President — are prescribed in
Article I of the Constitution. Because the veto did not follow these prescribed
procedures, it is unconstitutional. The tension between this conclusion and the
regulatory program to which it is addressed is revealed clearly by Justice
White’s dissent:
If Congress may delegate lawmaking power to independent and executive
agencies, it is most difficult to understand Article I as prohibiting Congress
from also reserving a check on legislative power for itself. Absent the veto,
the agencies receiving delegations of legislative or quasi-legislative power may
issue regulations having the force of law without bicameral approval and
without the President’s signature. It is thus not apparent why the reservation of
a veto over the exercise of that legislative power must be subject to a more
exacting test.113

The rather peculiar formalism at work in Chadha - namely, that a House
decision to veto an order granting relief from deportation is “legislative,” while
the order itself, made by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, is not
“legislative” in the same sense - illustrates the extent to which delegation is
now viewed by the courts as a normal incident of the regulatory process.
D. Legal Theory and Congressional Delegation: A Summary
It would be too strong to conclude that the pockets of jurisprudence
described above explain delegation or bear some tight causal relation to the
practice. My point is a more modest one. Generous judicial interpretations of
congressional power under the commerce clause, the routinization of
administrative law and consequent expansion of executive authority, and tight
restrictions on some congressional efforts to control administrative behavior all
create an environment in which the expectation is that Congress will delegate
broadly, with little or no questioning of its constitutional authority to do so. As
Cynthia Farina has argued,
The commitment to pervasive intervention in the economic and social order
that has vastly increased the level of extant federal power, the implementation
of this commitment through broad delegations of power to entities outside
Congress . . ., and the structural and customary factors that favor the President
in any struggle for control of the regulatory bureaucracy have coalesced to
create a persistent and decided tilt toward presidential dominance of large
sections of domestic policy.114

112. Id. at 952.
113. Id. at 986-87 (White, J., dissenting).
114. Farina, supra note 105, at 517.
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We may add to these observations Dr. Fisher’s important points about
presidential dominance of military affairs. The result is a governing system in
which what the President and the executive branch deem to be appropriate
policy will often trump congressional views to the contrary. In the next part, I
briefly speculate about the implications of this state of affairs for deliberative
democratic governance.
IV. ABDICATION, DELEGATION AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
As noted above, both Dr. Fisher, in his discussion of abdication, and critics
of delegation make strong claims that the practices that they respectively
address subvert democratic governance. Much of what I’ve said in the
previous sections casts serious doubts on such claims, but in this Part, I will
address these claims directly. My conclusion is that Dr. Fisher is more nearly
right than critics of delegation, although confident conclusions on these issues
are largely elusive.
My own viewpoint is that pinning the wisdom of governing practices on
some criteria of legitimacy, such as “democracy,” are largely meaningless
outside the content and effect of particular programs.115 For as Professor
Kahan has observed, “democracy” is an essentially contested concept, meaning
very different things to different people — disputes of meanings that cannot be
resolved by resort to logical argumentation.116 I thus agree with his conclusion
that a more productive approach to questions of delegation should replace
rhetorical appeals to “democratic self-rule” or other catchy soundbites. On this
view, we should “ask[] not which conception of democracy and corresponding
position on delegation are ‘best’ in the abstract, but which make the most sense
in a particular regulatory setting, given the values and interests at stake there”
— in other words, “whether delegation is desirable is decided locally, not
Indeed, arguments from democracy often function as
globally.”117
conversation stoppers, used to preclude inquiry into the actual functioning of
particular incidents of the general practices under discussion.
With these cautionary opening positions, I will now proceed to violate
them by pitching my views on delegation at a fairly high level of abstraction.
My point here is not to be conclusive, but to provide a framework in which
more particularized inquiry may proceed. My broad conclusions are that
congressional delegation of routine regulatory programs is, at worst, neutral
from the standpoint of deliberative democracy, but that congressional

115. For a more extended discussion of this view, focusing on environmental regulation, see
Douglas R. Williams, Environmental Law and Democratic Legitimacy, 4 DUKE ENVTL. L &
POL’Y F. 1 (1994).
116. Kahan, supra note 24, at 796.
117. Id. at 804.
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abdication of war and budgetary authority are in derogation of deliberative
democratic processes.
These conclusions are based largely on the work of Jerry Mashaw, who has
put forward a most convincing case in favor of broad congressional delegations
of policymaking authority to administrative agencies.118 Before proceeding to
the affirmative case for delegation, however, it is useful first to consider the
negative case against attempts to preclude delegation through judiciallyimposed constraint.
Assume that Congress were constrained to act within the confines of a
vigorous nondelegation doctrine. How would public programs likely function
in such an environment? Would “discretion” over how statutory programs are
to be implemented be eliminated or substantially reduced, thus ensuring that
congressional choices are actually respected and implemented? It is doubtful.
As Mashaw argues:
Squeezing discretion out of a statutory-administrative system is . . . so difficult
that one is tempted to posit a “Law of Conservation of Administrative
Discretion.” According to that law, the amount of discretion in an
administrative system is always constant. Elimination of discretion at one
choice point merely causes the discretion that had been exercised there to
migrate elsewhere in the system.119

We may go farther. The places within the system to which discretion may
migrate under a regime informed by strong nondelegation rules are likely to be
the least visible, and thus, the most difficult to oversee and the most immune
from public scrutiny. For example, imagine the leanest possible administrative
system: administration is limited to prosecutorial functions — civil and
criminal enforcement of the rules Congress enacts — and private enforcement
predominates. Who gets prosecuted and the terms on which disputes are
resolved are likely to be subject to the unstructured discretion of prosecutors
and private parties. Many disputes may never be publicly resolved, but settled
on terms known only to the disputants. The actual functioning of the programs
Congress enacts may thus be radically different in practice than in the statute
books. And even in disputes that are resolved by the courts, how can we be
sure that courts will, in applying statutory mandates, adhere to the purposes
and policies Congress has presumably selected? Even assuming that
“interpretation” of statutes is not a practice inherently informed by the views of
the interpreter — a most curious idea — it is nonetheless crystal clear that
remedies for statutory violations are largely discretionary with the courts,120

118. See generally MASHAW, supra note 13, at 131-157; MASHAW, Prodelegation, supra
note 18.
119. MASHAW, supra note 13, at 154.
120. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 543 (1987); RomeroBarcelo, 456 U.S. at 313.
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yielding an overall regulatory system that is virtually suffused with discretion.
And these matters are largely invisible to both Congress and the electorate.
Assume counterfactually that all possible discretion could be eliminated
through precisely worded statutory mandates addressed both to administrators
and the courts. Would the result comport with basic democratic aspirations?
Hardly. The likely result would be “wonderfully wooden administrative
behavior,” which, “on that ground alone [would] be highly objectionable.”121
An important, and largely uncontested (I think) value associated both with
rule-of-law notions and deliberative democratic rule is the sense that like cases
be treated alike and that relevant differences in context should yield up
different legal outcomes. The basic notion here is that “justice” is largely a
contextual matter, requiring nuanced attention to and deliberation about the
manner in which legal outcomes are likely to comport with the overall
purposes of the governing legal mandates. This approach is suffused with
discretion and informs our basic commitment to a “common law” method of
dispute resolution, which invites arguments through which prior outcomes can
be distinguished and harmonized by appeals to more general — but certainly
less determinate — principles.
Of course, critics of delegation may be more comfortable in a regime
where judicial discretion supplants administrative discretion to the greatest
extent possible. Prima facie, however, if this is an integral part of the case
against delegation, it is hard to connect that case with anything that looks like
“democracy.” Judges are, after all, the least accountable political actors in our
system of governance.
The affirmative case for delegation from the perspective of deliberative
democracy emphasizes several key points. First, the administrative law system
with its norms of public participation and provision for meaningful judicial
review provide opportunities for decision makers to adjust the demands of
regulatory programs to better fit the actual, “on-the-ground” circumstances to
which they are applied, even as these circumstances vary across space and
time. A strong form of nondelegation would preclude such nice adjustments,
for “the high transaction costs of specific legislation will give an enormous
advantage to the status quo, and the status quo will be susceptible to change [or
adjustment] only by a statute of the same kind.”122
Second, while administrators are not directly accountable to the public, the
president — who is constitutionally charged with the duty to see that laws are
faithfully executed123 — is directly accountable to the electorate. Schoenbrod,
acknowledging this, rests his “delegation is anti-democratic” argument on the
notion that legislators are more accountable for the policy decisions they make
121. MASHAW, supra note 13, at 154.
122. Id. at 153.
123. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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than is the President for decisions made by administrative agencies. He states
that “accountability through the president matters less than accountability
through Congress and, whatever the potential worth of presidential
accountability might be, delegation diminishes its value.”124 This is so, the
argument goes, because the president’s responsibility for any one particular
agency policy would be “diluted by the electorate’s concern about activities in
other areas such as national defense, foreign affairs, law enforcement, and so
on.”125 By contrast, because legislators are voted in from districts in which
“there are likely to be a limited number of issues of particular local interest,”126
public attention will be more focused on legislative activity.
There are number of reasons to question this logic. First, it is precisely on
issues “of particular local interest” that legislators are unlikely to delegate,
preferring instead to push for the favored position in order to gain credit.127
Delegation is most likely the product of intense conflict among constituencies
— a circumstance in which a delegation allows legislators to blame agencies
for adverse constituent effects, while at the same time claiming credit for
delivering the goods to benefited constituencies.
Second, and somewhat in tension with the first point, it is not clear why
constituents, particularly those that are politically active and engaged, will not
understand some forms of delegation for what they are — shirking of
responsibility to make the “hard policy choices.” If voters can be duped by
delegations in the manner anti-delegation scholars suggest, it is not apparent
why we would want more “democracy,” for that would simply ensure that
decisions are being made by individuals who probably don’t understand what it
is they are supporting. A more generous view of the voting public’s political
wisdom would suggest that, in terms of democratic values, delegations are
basically neutral. Many voters who would prefer legislated “rule” statutes may
be willing to settle for a broad delegation to an agency if the alternative is no
legislation at all. Similarly, those who would prefer no legislation as an
alternative to a legislated rule statute will presumably make their preferences
known at the ballot box.
Third, the conclusion Schoenbrod reaches about presidential accountability
might with equal force be applied to Congress. If the electorate is only
concerned about a limited number of issues of particular local interest, they are
most unlikely to pay any attention to what their representatives do with respect
to other issues. We may expect that issues of “particular local concern” will
vary from district to district and from state to state. Thus, representatives will

124. SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 106.
125. Id. at 105-06.
126. Id. at 106.
127. See generally Aranson et al., supra note 22 (stating that legislative delegation is unlikely
in matters of particular local interest).
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advance a variety of legislative proposals to effectively address these issues. If
Schoenbrod is right, we may expect that members of Congress can cast their
votes for legislation important to the nation as a whole, but of no “particular
local interest,” without fear of electoral accountability. It is not clear why this
advances a stronger form of democratic self-rule than does broad delegations
to agencies whose decisions of national importance must be defended by the
President to a national constituency.
Finally, Schoenbrod’s logic ignores the debilitating effects of
congressional action that is responsive only to issues of particular local
concern. This would be a Congress who is concerned mostly about, and will
be judged only on, its ability to deliver the goods to local constituencies.
Schoenbrod’s nondelegation argument may, thus, be a recipe for pork barrel
politics. As Mashaw puts it:
Assume . . . the voter chooses a representative for that representative’s
effectiveness in supplying governmental goods and services to the local
district, including the voter. The representative is a good representative or a
bad representative depending upon his or her ability to provide the district with
at least its fair of governmental largesse. In this view, the congressperson’s
position on various issues of national interest is of modest, if any, importance.
The only question is, Does he or she “bring home the bacon.”128

If this is right, nondelegation may result in a Congress that is particularly
responsive to powerful local interests, but unresponsive to the electorate as a
whole. One recalls President Roosevelt’s remarks in vetoing the Walter-Logan
bill, an administrative procedure act that would have severely constrained
administrative power:
Wherever a continuing series of controversies exist between a powerful and
concentrated interest on one side and a diversified mass of individuals, each of
whose separate interests may be small, on the other side, the only means of
obtaining equality before the law has been to place the controversy in an
administrative tribunal.129

All this is not to say that Schoenbrod is wrong to claim that there are
dangers associated with delegation. But even if we think congressional
involvement in making policy is critical to effective democratic rule, his
delegation-is-anti-democratic argument fails to consider seriously
congressional influence on the choices agencies make in implementing their
delegated powers. Congress’s policy preferences may effectively control
bureaucratic behavior, even if those preferences are not formally expressed in
statutes. Through oversight, Congress may wield significant and continuing
128. MASHAW, supra note 13, at 152.
129. Veto Message, Walter-Logan Bill, reprinted in 86 CONG. REC. 13, 942-3 (1940) (quoted
in George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from
New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1627 (1996)).
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influence over administrative policy long after its formal legislative powers
have been exercised. The effectiveness of such oversight is an empirical issue.
Studies of congressional influence over administrative behavior have yielded
mixed results.130
The studies that suggest strong congressional influence over administrative
policy do raise a possible problem with broad delegations, but it is not clear
that it is a problem of democratic accountability. In arguing for the
effectiveness of congressional oversight of agencies, the focus of study is
typically on the influence of individual members or committees, not the
Congress as an institution.131 The delegation problem, then, is not one
involving open-ended authority on the part of the President and agencies to
make national policy. Instead, it may serve as a technique through which
members of Congress, through “fire alarm” oversight, respond in a more
particular fashion to concerns expressed by their constituents than would be
possible if Congress, as an institution, were to attempt to do so.132 In these
circumstances, matters of “particular local concern” are addressed quite
directly by legislators’ actions, but the results may be ones that the public as a
whole would reject.
Matters are a bit different on questions of wars and budgets. The
phenomenon addressed by Dr. Fisher clearly does not implicate many of the
critical saving features that are often advanced in support of broad delegations.
Chief among these omissions is the utter lack of structure associated with
presidential decision making on matters of war and budgets. In this area, there
is virtually no opportunity for public participation and there is, of course, no
serious judicial demand for justification and explanation of the choices
presidents make on these matters. Presidents do, of course, typically take their
cases for wars and budgets to the people, but the actual decisional processes

130. See generally David Epstein & Sharon O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the
Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 954-60 (1999)
(reviewing literature on congressional influence on agencies); Peter H. Aranson, et al., A Theory
of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 51-52 (1982) (same). For specific studies, see
Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 271
(John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson, eds. 1989); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran,
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal
Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983); Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz,
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, in CONGRESS:
STRUCTURE & POLICY 426 (Mathew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan, eds. 1987) (hereinafter
“Fire Alarms”); James B. Pearson, Oversight: A Vital Yet Neglected Congressional Function, 23
KAN. L. REV. 277 (1975).
131. See, e.g., McCubbins & Schwartz, Fire Alarms, supra note 130, at 437 (arguing that
“congress” effectively oversees administrative agencies through a “decentralized, incentive-based
control mechanism” through which individual members exert pressure in response to “fire
alarms” - complaints by interest groups or constituents).
132. See Aranson et al., supra note 22, at 55-62.
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are shrouded in secrecy, with presidents enjoying a virtual monopoly of
information on matters of war and a battery of dubious studies to support the
most rosy projections associated with specific budget choices.
The temptation for presidents to place their own electoral interests and
desire for “immortal fame” above public interests in these two areas of
governance are notorious to the point of satire — witness, the popularized and
utterly cynical view of presidential warmaking represented by Hollywood in
the movie Wag the Dog. Likewise, presidential elections of late have become
contests for fiscal responsibility, with largely unsubstantiated claims that we
can enjoy massive tax cuts without feeling any pinch to the domestic programs
of critical importance to the electorate as a whole.
CONCLUSION
Congressional power in the modern age has waned to a considerable
degree, causing us to reevaluate the constitutional structure of our governing
institutions. The phenomenon is much broader than the case for abdication
advanced by Dr. Fisher as to war and budgetary powers. At the same time, we
should not quickly conclude that current arrangements present us with a
constitutional crisis of large proportions. Routine exercises of legislative
power to create public programs the content of which is largely administrative
in origin is not self-evidently a bad thing, nor is it necessarily inconsistent with
our basic democratic aspirations. Yes, there are dangers attending this
practice, but governance to be effective and consistent with democratic
aspirations depends critically on vigilant and discerning scrutiny by the
electorate of our leaders’ actions. If delegation is inconsistent with our
aspirations for government, we should insist that the practice be halted by
voting the rascals out. There is, however, no reason to believe that the current
administrative state is not as responsive, or perhaps even more responsive, to
public demand than a regime of strict nondelegation would be.
On war and budgetary matters, things may be quite different. I agree with
Dr. Fisher that current congressional behavior in these matters is cause for
concern. Congress must meet its constitutional responsibilities, and in wars
and budgets, its actions have fallen considerably short of that responsibility.
Let us hope that Dr. Fisher’s pleas for reform will make a lasting contribution
to our democratic form of government.
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